时论广场》对南韩新政局的台湾策略（方恩格 Ross Darrell Feingold）

南韩总统选举结果出炉，代表保守派国民力量党（韩国传统保守政党合併后的现称）尹锡悦胜选，这意味着南韩即将面对重大变化。

外交上，尹在上任后很可能会调整文在寅过去对中国和朝鲜议题上的做法，并且开始试图改善与日本的关系。在内政部分，文在寅的共同民主党（韩国中间偏左翼政党合併后的现称）阵营，与台湾的民进党、美国的民主党或西欧的左翼政党相较，走的是中间偏左路线，在性别平等等社会议题上，可以预见新上任的尹锡悦则会比原本的文在寅路线更加保守。

尹上任后即将面临他的在野党共同民主党在国会中占多数的挑战，这与台湾当年陈水扁执政8年期间，立法院的蓝营席次多于绿营的情况相似。

文在寅在2017年5月当选不久后，便着手改善前任总统朴槿惠总统任期中、韩国部署美国反导弹系统所造成的中韩僵局。同年南韩与中国恢復了外交上的正常往来后，南韩便开始了一连串对台湾不太友善的举措，例如在2018 年与中国联手投票取消台中主办东亚青年运动会的主办权、媒体所质疑因南韩的施压，台湾从事「潜舰国造」计画的一批韩国工程师离台回到南韩，以及去年年底最近韩国外交部由于顾虑中国反应、在最后一刻取消了数位政委唐凤在「第四次工业革命委员会」的线上演讲邀请。时值世界各国（如日本退位首相安倍晋三、立陶宛、唐凤受邀参加民主峰会等）挺台湾的声浪出现，身为人权律师总统文在寅政府却派南韩外交部给台湾设了一个「将继续促进与台湾的非正式的实质交流」的门槛限制，实为讽刺。

儘管文在寅对台湾并非友好，但两国之间的贸易和旅游业在新冠肺炎疫情爆发期间仍然持续增长。

去年5月拜登总统和文在寅总统会晤后发表的联合声明中，其中略提到了维护台海和平与稳定的重要性，虽然在台湾有部分人士对此感到雀跃，但就笔者观察，这份措辞谨慎的声明仅将台湾海峡作为一个地域的概念来描述，完全避开提及台湾人民、政府或主权、自治等会引起中国不满的概念。

美国国防部长奥斯汀（Lloyd Austin）在2021年12月会见韩国国防部长徐旭时，对于台湾议题使用的也都是这般谨慎的措辞。他们在会后所发表的美韩安保声明中提到：「双方共同认知维护台海和平稳定的重要性，反映两国在5月峰会的联合声明。」除此之外，并未透露什么支援台湾的进一步资讯。在随后的记者会上，徐旭更是避答记者关于南韩是否会与台湾共同防御中国的问题。而在南韩的国会中，不时有国会议员表示希望避免南韩卷入台湾与中国之间可能发生的军事衝突。

2022年3月9日在美国眾议院军事委员会听证会上，有眾议院议员提问：如果中国攻击台湾，驻韩美军是否能加入保卫台湾，现场的美国政府官员也是避答此问题。

鉴于近年台湾与日本的互动，蔡政府接下来可能会採取主动姿态，寻求与新任的尹政府增进双方关系。在社交媒体上，遇到重大事件如颱风等灾害发生时、或南韩的重大节日、纪念日时，台湾政府想必会採取他们喜欢的PO文外交，写上几句韩语、配一个可爱的插图，向新任南韩政府示好。若北韩再度试飞导弹或採取其他挑衅的行动，南韩的新任政府很可能会发布比起前任政府更更强烈的谴责声明，而台湾外交部想必也会跟进发一些支援的声明。政党层面而言，民进党可能会希望与南韩的国民力量党加强关系，例如举行视讯会议讨论区域安全问题等议题，类似于民进党与日本自民党的做法。

放眼过去与尹锡悦政治光谱接近的南韩右派保守派前任总统们，儘管朴槿惠在任期间因为部署美国反导弹系统而与中国撕破脸，她与上一任总统李明博在台湾议题上均採保守路线，并未明确表达对台湾支持与否。所以台湾不需要对新任政府会主动做出友台行为抱持着过多期待，然而就算之前被冷处理，台湾政府仍应该勇敢尝试提点即将上任的尹锡悦政府、主动引导尹政府，提出让他们能表达对台湾支持的建议，例如邀请高层级的台湾政界人士出席总统就职典礼、在尹就职几周后即将举行的年度世界卫生大会中，发出对于支持台湾参加的声明、在美国所推出抗衡中国「一带一路」的「蓝点网络」计画或「印太经济框架」等区域经济整合计画中发声支持台湾的参与、或者依循过往的多次前例，在南韩空军参加国际航展时多停靠台湾补给加油。虽然政府官员之间以部长级访台的可能性不大，但台湾政府也应主动促进双方政界之间更频繁互访。

而民进党所面临到的挑战是，如何以政治光谱上位置不尽相同的新任南韩保守派执政党建立密切的关系，在社会议题上抱持着不同观点的同时，基于对于中国的共同态度，建立合作方式。

在这次南韩总统选举之中，我们可以观察到南韩民意在进步派与保守派之间的支持度僵持不下。而台湾的执政党最近在对加拿大、日本和美国等国的外交政策中，也出现不少为了拉拢亲台政党而与政治光谱不同边的外国当地政党合作例子。与韩国新政府关系的建立，究竟是要亲近与台湾执政党政治意向不尽相同的新任执政党？还是要遵循党派的政治光谱而行，考虑下次有可能发生的政权交替中，台湾该如何与不同政党也保持友好关系？这是台湾的外交政策制定者需要仔细思量的问题。

（作者为前美国共和党亚太区主席）

英文全文：

Yoon Suk-yeol Election Victory and Taiwan

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad

Twitter: @RossFeingold

President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol election victory will mean significant changes in domestic as well as foreign policies. Representing the conservative People Power Party (the current name for the amalgamation of South Korea’s legacy conservative political parties), Yoon is expected to adjust, or even reverse, outgoing President Moon Jae-in’s accommodations towards China and North Korea, and seek better relations with Japan. In domestic policy, Moon’s Democratic Party (the current name for the amalgamation of South Korea’s legacy left-of-center political parties), was not as progressive as Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, the United States Democratic Party, or Western European left-of-center parties, but Yoon is more conservative than Moon on social issues such as gender or sexual minority equality.

Yoon must also manage the challenges of governing despite a Democratic Party majority in the National Assembly, a situation similar to when President Chen Shui-bian governed for eight years despite his Democratic Progressive Party having a minority in the Legislative Yuan.

The outgoing government of President Moon Jae-in was no friend to Taiwan. Shortly after he was elected in May 2017, Moon strenuously sought to improve relations with China that had deteriorated due to President Park’s decision to deploy the US made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and a restoration of normal relations occurred later that year. Decisions such as South Korea’s vote with China in 2018 to rescind Taichung’s hosting rights for the East Asian Youth Games, the departure (possibly due to South Korean government pressure) from Taiwan of South Korean engineers working on Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program, and more recently, the last minute recission of an invitation for Digital Minister Audrey Tang to speak via video at a forum on the fourth industrial revolution following which South Korea’s foreign ministry emphasized it "will continuously promote informal and substantive exchanges with Taiwan."

Notwithstanding Moon’s aversion to Taiwan, trade and tourism between the two countries continued to grow prior to COVID-19.

Although the joint statement by President Biden and President Moon when they met in May last year which mentioned the Taiwan Strait (“President Biden and President Moon emphasize the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”) excited some in Taiwan, the carefully worded statement merely treated Taiwan as a location and avoided references to Taiwan’s people, government, or the reality of its autonomous existence. This careful wording was repeated when US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met South Korea’s Defense Minister Suh Wook in December 2021, as their communique simply said they “acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as reflected in the May 2021 Joint Statement between President Biden and President Moon”, and at a press conference afterwards Suh avoided answering a reporter’s question as to South Korea’s involvement in the defense of a Taiwan should China attack. South Korea National Assembly members periodically express a desire to avoid Korean involvement in a China-Taiwan war, and, on 9 March 2022 at a hearing of the United States House Committee on Armed Services, when asked by House members about South Korea’s views on whether, in the event China attacks Taiwan, Korea-based American troops could join the battle to defend Taiwan, US government officials avoided answering the question.

If Taiwan’s relations with Japan in recent years are a guide, the current government of Taiwan is likely to take several actions to seek better relations with Yoon’s government. Social media messages in Mandarin and Korean to mark significant festivals, or to express concern when there is a natural or man-made disaster such typhoon or transportation accidents, are likely to be sent by Taiwan’s government with the hope South Korea begins to reciprocate. When North Korea (inevitably) conducts missile tests or takes other provocative actions, the new South Korean government is likely to issue more forceful statements to condemn North Korea than those issued by President Moon’s government, and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is likely to issue similarly forceful statements condemning the risk to regional security. The Democratic Progressive Party is likely to seek stronger party-to-party relations with Yoon’s People Power Party, such as by holding videoconferences to discuss regional security similar to what the Democratic Progressive Party does with Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.

The recent conservative presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye did not make any grand gestures of support for Taiwan, notwithstanding President Park’s willingness to incur China’s anger over the installation of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. However, Taiwan need not be shy in expressing its expectations for action from Yoon. Possibilities include an appropriate high level representative from Taiwan who attends Yoon’s inauguration, a strong statement of support for Taiwan’s participation in this year’s annual World Health Assembly meeting which occurs weeks after Yoon’s inauguration, support for Taiwan’s participation in regional economic initiatives that the United States organizes such as the “Blue Dot Network” or the “Indo Pacific Economic Framework”, and continuing the precedent for South Korean air force aircraft to refuel in Taiwan on their way to air shows elsewhere (which will certainly incur China’s anger amid worsening of China-Taiwan relations). Although a South Korea ministerial level visit to Taiwan is unlikely, Taiwan should encourage more parliamentary visits.

Inevitably, the Democratic Progressive Party will seek a close relationship with a conservative president and political party that do not share similar views on social issues. The basis of the relationships will be shared views about China. However, South Korea’s recent presidential elections show the voters are willing to shift back-and-forth between a progressive and conservative president. Taiwan has sometimes appeared partisan in its recent foreign policy initiatives in Canada, Japan and the United States among other countries. Whether relations with the new South Korean government follow a similar partisan track or are calibrated to remain bi-partisan so as to be sustainable if power reverts again to the progressives at the next presidential election requires careful consideration by Taiwan’s foreign policy makers.